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1. Problems of inclusive reference anaphora: A bird’s eye view
Sentences in which an object overlaps in reference with a c-
commanding noun phrase in its local domain (cf. Postal 1974:77–82,
Lasnik 1989 for seminal work; for recent discussion, see Safir, forthc.:
Chapter 3, and references therein) never involve a reflexive in English —
(1a–c) are all ungrammatical. Both Principle A of Chomsky’s (1981) Bind-
ing Theory (2a) and Condition A of Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) ‘reflex-
ivity’ approach to binding (3a) straightforwardly guarantee the ill-formed-
ness of (1): the object reflexives are not coindexed with the local subjects,
nor are the reflexive-marked predicates (fully) reflexive. The anaphor cases
of inclusive reference anaphora would hence seem to be under control.
(1) a *we saw/voted for/elected myself
b. *I saw/voted for/elected ourselves
c. *he saw/voted for/elected ourselves
(2) a. Principle A: an anaphor is bound in its local domain
b. Principle B: a pronoun is free in its local domain
(3) a. Condition A: a reflexive-marked predicate is reflexive
b. Condition B: a reflexive predicate is reflexive-marked
When the reflexive in (1) is replaced with a pronoun, as in (4) (where
we have suppressed diacritics marking grammaticality), both the theoretical
predictions and the empirical facts turn out to be substantially trickier.
Discussions in the extant literature report varying judgements on (4a,b),
some bringing in additional semantic factors (like the collective/
distributive dichotomy; cf. especially Reinhart and Reuland 1993) along the
way, others essentially dismissing the entire issue as ‘beside the point’ and
‘contrived’ (cf. Chomsky 1981:314 n. 3; also cf. Chomsky 1973).
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(4) a. we saw/voted for/elected me
b. I saw/voted for/elected us
c. he saw/voted for/elected us
What Principle B (2b) would say about the pronoun cases in (4)
depends on one’s interpretation of ‘free’. If BT–B demands that there be no
coindexed binder in the pronoun’s governing category, all examples in (4)
are ruled in; if, on the other hand, BT–B demands that there be no overlap
in reference (‘intersection of indices’ in Lasnik’s 1986 terms) between a
pronoun and a local potential antecedent, all examples in (4) are ruled out.
For (4a), the ‘reflexivity’ approach to binding à la Reinhart and Reuland
(1993), with its distinction between syntactic and semantic predicates,
allows one to take a more subtle position, one that distinguishes between
collective and distributive readings. On the assumption that ‘predicate’ in
(3) equals ‘semantic predicate’, (4a) with vote for is ungrammatical because
the semantic representation of this distributive predication contains a
reflexive predicate x voted for x (with x=I/me) which, in violation of (3b), is
not reflexive-marked. The variant of (4a) with elect, by contrast, is well-
formed since it involves a collective predicate; the semantic representation
of this sentence hence does not include a reflexive predicate at all, and
Condition B never comes into play. This account of the difference between
vote for and elect in (4a) is potentially interesting, though the judgements
that underlie it are not generally shared. On a more general plane, many
speakers find the different-person case of inclusive reference anaphora in
(4c) better than the same-person cases in (4a,b), a cut which neither the
Condition B approach nor the Principle B account would seem equipped to
make.
A bird’s eye view of several decades of intensive research on binding
would have it, then, that the anaphor cases of inclusive reference are
essentially under control, but that there is serious disagreement about the
treatment of the pronoun cases — both as far as the facts go, and with
respect to the theoretical machinery needed to handle them. But this picture
seems both too optimistic and too pessimistic, as we will argue.
In this paper, we will present binding facts from Hungarian to show
two basic things. First, that languages do not systematically rule out
inclusive reference with reflexives — Hungarian allows the counterpart of
(1b), seemingly calling the optimistic view with respect to anaphors into
question. And second, that more microscopic (agreement) properties of
language allow us to substantially tidy up the picture with respect to
inclusive pronoun reference — Hungarian accepts the counterpart of (4b)
with an out-of-the-ordinary type of object agreement only, a proper
understanding of which makes us optimistic about the binding theory’s
chances of accommodating the inclusive-reference pronoun cases. Along
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the way, we will exploit our Hungarian data to make a case against the
semantic-predicate based approach to Condition B of Reinhart and Reuland
(1993), and to argue for a syntactically complex representation of first
person plural pronouns (in terms of a comitative-like structure).
2. A fresh perspective: The case of Hungarian
2.1. Reflexives and inclusive reference
In English, all examples in (1) are impossible. Interestingly, however,
Hungarian differentiates between the plural–singular and singular–plural
same-person cases in this domain: as seen in (5), the former is bad with a
reflexive whereas the latter is perfect (in fact, by far the best way of
translating something like English I saw/represented/elected us in
Hungarian; we turn to translations featuring a pronominal object in section
2.2). The counterpart of English (1c) with a first person plural reflexive
object is ungrammatical.
(5) a.  *mi magamat {látjuk/képviseljük/választjuk meg}
we myself-ACC see-1PL.DEF/represent-1PL.DEF/elect-1PL.DEF  PV
b. én magunkat {látom/képviselem/választom meg}
I  ourselves-ACC see-1SG.DEF/represent-1SG.DEF/elect-1SG.DEF PV
c.  *ª magunkat {látja/képviseli/választja meg}
(s)he ourselves-ACC see-3SG.DEF/represent-3SG.DEF/elect-3SG.DEF PV
Two things are worth noting in addition. First, the asymmetry in (5a,b)
is not specific to reflexives in direct object positions: it rears its head in all
reflexive contexts, including the dative examples in (6a,b).1
(6) a.  *hozunk magamnak sört
bring/fetch-1PL.INDEF myself-DAT beer-ACC
b. hozok magunknak sört
bring/fetch-1SG.INDEF ourselves-DAT beer-ACC
c. hoz magunknak sört
bring/fetch-3SG.INDEF ourselves-DAT beer-ACC
                                                          
1. A ‘real-life’ example we found, featuring an ‘about’–PP, is magam sem tudom,
mit is gondolnék a helyükben magunkról ‘I don’t know myself either what I would
think about ourselves (i.e., us) in their place’. The fact that (6c) is grammatical (in
contrast to (5c)) is presumably due to the fact that in contexts of the type in (6)
(unlike in (5), where the reflexive object and the subject are co-arguments)
logophoric construal of the anaphor is possible; we leave this aside here.
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And secondly, inclusive reference is not in general asymmetric in
Hungarian. The examples in (7) are both grammatical; in (7a) the reference
of the subject is included in that of the non-subject (cf. (5b), (6b)) while in
(7b) it is exactly the other way around. Hence, the facts in (5) and (6)
cannot be explained with an appeal to some general ‘asymmetry constraint’
on Hungarian inclusive reference.
(7) a. az  elsªsök fogalmazást írtak az iskolásokról
the first-graders essay-ACC write-PAST-3PL.INDEF the pupils-about
b. az iskolások fogalmazást írtak az elsªsökrªl
the pupils essay-ACC write-PAST-3PL.INDEF the first-graders-about
2.2. Pronouns and inclusive reference: The role of agreement
In the domain of object pronouns, we find a similar kind of asymmetry
in the context of inclusive reference anaphora, but in the opposite direction:
(8a) and (8c) are grammatical this time, and (8b) is bad. Given the general
complementarity between pronouns and anaphors that the binding theory
predicts, this is not much of a surprise.
(8) a. mi engem képviselünk/választunk meg
we me represent/elect-1PL.INDEF PV
b.  *én minket/bennünket választok meg
I us/us elect-1SG.INDEF PV
c. ª minket/bennünket választ meg
(s)he us/us elect-3SG.INDEF PV
More interesting, however, is the fact that, although the reflexive (as in
(5b)) is the expression of choice in the same-person singular–plural case for
all speakers, there are informants who report that for them, the first person
plural object pronouns minket/bennünket ‘us’ can be used in this context,
provided that the verb bears definite agreement.2 So for all Hungarians (8b)
is ungrammatical; for many, the same holds for (9b), but for a subset of
speakers this example, with definite agreement on the finite verb, is
grammatical. Using definite verb agreement in plural–singular inclusive
reference cases such as (8a) or in different-person inclusive reference
contexts like (8c), on the other hand, is completely impossible throughout
(cf. (9a,c)).
                                                          
2. For those speakers who accept (9b) alongside (5b), then, the first person object
pronoun and its corresponding reflexive anaphor can be used interchangeably here.
This is not to say that, even for those speakers, there are no differences between
pronouns and reflexives in the domain of first (and second) person at all. As Anna
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(9) a.  *mi engem képviseljük/választjuk meg
we me represent/elect-1PL.DEF PV
b.  %én minket/bennünket választom meg
I us/us elect-1SG.DEF PV
c.  *ª minket/bennünket választja meg
(s)he us/us elect-3SG.DEF PV
Speaker variation ‘mellows’ when, instead of minket/bennünket, either
one of two other Hungarian first person plural object pronouns is selected:
mindannyiunkat and mindnyájunkat (both translating as ‘us all/all of us’).
This time, speakers who reject both (8b) and (9b) outright report less
categorical judgements; and significantly, of the two variants of (10), the
one with definite agreement is again deemed better than the one with
indefinite agreement (confirming the picture emerging from the examples
with minket/bennünket). Thus the pattern seen to hold for some speakers in
the context of (8b)/(9b) is reproducible for all speakers (in a somewhat less
robust yet still interesting way) when mindannyiunkat or mindnyájunkat is
selected. We take it, then, that the facts are systematic — singular–plural
same-person pronominal anaphora in inclusive reference contexts triggers
definite agreement; plural–singular and different-person pronominal inclus-
ive reference anaphora, on the other hand, consistently gives rise to indefi-
nite agreement.
(10)a.  ??figyelmeztetek mindannyiunkat/mindnyájunkat
warn-1SG.INDEF us all/all of us
b. ?figyelmeztetem mindannyiunkat/mindnyájunkat
warn-1SG.DEF us all/all of us
‘I (will) warn us all’
2.3. Notes on Hungarian agreement
Which of these two agreement patterns is the surprising one? The
answer to this question turns out to be: the one with definite agreement. For
in Hungarian, first (and second) person object pronouns normally trigger
indefinite agreement on the finite verb — that is, despite their semantic
definiteness, they pattern with indefinite noun phrases when it comes to the
determination of verb agreement.
The examples in (11)–(13) serve to illustrate this. The ones in (11)
feature a variety of garden-variety definite noun phrase objects and the verb
                                                                                                                  
Szabolcsi (personal communication) points out to us, the pronoun will typically
identify a group without individuating its members while the anaphor will be used if
the speaker knows all the people who make up the group.
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shows up with definite inflection as a result.3 In (12) the object is indefinite
and concomitantly the verb bears indefinite agreement morphology. These
two pairs set the stage for an inspection of (13), the key examples involving
a first person object pronoun. And here we find (to our initial surprise,
given that first person object pronouns are unquestionably definite) that
indefinite agreement is the only option.4
(11)a.  *szeret {magát/ªt/ Jánost/a srácot}
like-3SG.INDEF himself/herself/him/János/the guy
b. szereti {magát/ªt/Jánost/a srácot}
like-3SG.DEF himself/herself/him/János/the guy
(12)a. szeret {valakit/ egy lányt/mindenkit}
like-3SG.INDEF someone/a girl/everyone




b.  *szereti {engem/minket/bennünket}
like-3SG.DEF me/us/ us
In Den Dikken (1999), a detailed account of the syntax of Hungarian
first and second person object pronouns is developed which explains the
prima facie astonishing behaviour of the pronouns in (13) in the domain of
definiteness agreement. We need not concern ourselves with the details of
this analysis here. The thing to bear in mind is, quite simply, that whenever
Hungarian first (or second) person pronouns are themselves the direct
object, they obligatorily trigger indefinite agreement on the finite verb. Let
us lay this down in the generalisation in (14):
(14)Hungarian first/second person pronouns in direct object position trigger
indefinite agreement
                                                          
3. On Hungarian maga ‘him/herself’ as a definite noun phrase, see section 3.2,
below.
4. Second person object pronouns behave like first person object pronouns when
it comes to verb agreement: they likewise trigger indefinite agreement. For
mindnyájunkat and mindannyiunkat ‘us all’ (cf. (10)) and their second person
counterparts mindnyájatokat and mindannyiótokat ‘you all’, the agreement judge-
ments are hazier, although there, too, speakers prefer indefinite agreement in a
context such as (13) (while they prefer definite agreement in inclusive reference
contexts like (10)).
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From the perspective of this generalisation, the we...me (8a) and
(s)he...us (8c) cases of inclusive anaphora in Hungarian are entirely
uneventful: the object pronoun triggers indefinite agreement, as usual. But
singular–plural same-person cases of inclusive anaphora (I...us) treat us on
two surprises — one concerning speaker variation, and one concerning the
form of finite verb agreement. Those speakers for whom (9b) is good do not
seem to treat minket/bennünket as a garden-variety first person object
pronoun — or else they would have elected to use indefinite agreement, as
in (8b) (which is impossible for all speakers). If the generalisation in (14)
holds exceptionlessly, then the conclusion that suggests itself is that in (9b)
we are not in fact dealing with a first person object pronoun:
(15) if (14) holds exceptionlessly, then (9b) does not feature a first person
direct object pronoun
This, we believe, is precisely the right conclusion to draw — and by
drawing it we can make the Hungarian pronominal inclusive reference facts
canvassed in section 2.2 fit in perfectly with Principle B (3b) of the binding
theory of Chomsky (1981).
3. The facts explained
3.1. The pronoun cases
The empirical generalisation that now presents itself for the paradigms
in (8) and (9), against the background of our conclusion in (15), is (16):
(16)a. the reference of a first person pronoun in direct object position can
be included in the reference of a same-person subject
b. the reference of a first person pronoun in direct object position
cannot include the reference of a same-person subject
That is, in order for I...us to come out right in Hungarian (with an
accusative pronoun instead of a reflexive), the first person plural accusative
pronoun must not be in the regular direct object position (which is reflected
in the emergence of definite agreement in (9b)). But if its reference includes
that of a local subject of a different person (as in (8c)), it must be placed in
the direct object position. And a first person singular accusative pronoun is
always construed as the direct object (and hence triggers indefinite agree-
ment systematically), in inclusive and non-inclusive reference cases alike.
This is exactly the result one expects once one realises that first person
plural pronouns have a syntactically complex representation in languages
like Hungarian — a comitative structure of the type instantiated by exam-
ples of the type in (17) (cf. Hetzron 1973, Schwartz 1985).
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(17) [(mi) a n YpUHPPHO@ nem mentünk moziba
   we the sister-1SG-COMIT not went-1PL cinema-to
‘my sister and I did not go to the cinema’
The thing to note about such examples is that the comitative phrase ‘we
with my sister’ is a constituent and it is introduced by the first person plural
pronoun mi (which may freely be dropped — Hungarian is a pro-drop
language), despite the fact that Q YpU ‘sister’ has a first person singular
possessor. Since it is mi that is responsible for first person plural agreement
on the finite verb (mentünk), the structure of PLDQ YpUHPmel ‘we with my
sister’ will be headed by the first person plural pronoun.5
But mi is not itself the subject of the comitative PP containing a
Q YpUHP ‘my sister’ — instead, we suggest, the comitative PP has a first
person singular null subject (pro), and this entire predication is construed
with mi; cf. Vassilieva (2000) and Larson and Vassilieva (2001) for an
interesting argument to the effect that the first person plural pronoun takes
the comitative phrase as its complement (but nothing hinges on the
complement/adjunct distinction here: for our purposes, the comitative could
also be an adjunct). The resulting structure reads roughly as in (18), where
x, y and z are non-first person null pronouns.6
                                                          
5. That the head of the comitative phrase is ‘we’, not ‘I’, is clear not only from
verb agreement (which some might wish to analyse in semantic rather than syntactic
terms) but also from control: on the comitative (or inclusive) interpretation of
KRVV]DVKDER]iVXWiQ HOLQGXOWXQND YH]HW PPHO ‘after long hesitation, we (i.e., I)
left with my guide’, the controller of the adjunct is ‘we’ (‘me and the guide’), not ‘I’
(see Hetzron 1973). While this indicates clearly that comitatives have a structure
with a plural pronoun as its head, two questions come up with respect to the null
pronoun inside SC linked to the head. First, it is apparently a fact about the repres-
entation of ‘we’ that the subject of the SC in (18) is always pro1SG (i.e., ‘I’) — the
first person singular subpart of the structure of ‘we’ apparently cannot be
represented in the complement of the comitative P (with any one of x, y, z occupying
the subject position). We suspect (though more careful consideration is needed) that
this restriction is rooted in the content-licensing requirement on this pro: it must be
content-licensed, for person, by the head of the complex noun phrase, and must
therefore be sufficiently local to its content-licenser. Secondly, the subject of the SC
in the structure in (18) cannot be a lexical pronoun: as Hetzron (1973) points out,
*pQDQ YpUHPPHOQHPPHQWQNPR]LED ‘I the sister-my-with not went-1PL cinema-
to’ is ungrammatical, even though, in substandard Hungarian, ?DIpUILDYH]HW MpYHO
elindultak ‘the man the guide-his-with off-left-3PL’, with a full DP instead of pro, is
an acceptable comitative (on third person comitatives, see also Camacho 2000). We
cannot address the roots of this restriction here.
6. The representation in (18) is not unlike Rooryck’s 1998 structure of second
person plural pronouns: [PRO [WITH pro]]. Rooryck’s structure of first person
plural pronouns is more complex. Rooryck shows that in the languages that he
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(18) [NP ‘we’/‘us’ [SC pro1SG [PP COMIT [x (& y (& z ...))]]]]
We propose (18) as the structure of first person plural pronouns in
languages like Hungarian — an abstract comitative structure, overtly reflec-
ted by constructions of the type in (17). Given this representation of first
person plural pronouns, three different patterns of inclusive reference
possibilities present themselves, schematically presented in (19):
(19)a. [NP ‘we’ [SC proi [PP COMIT [xj (& yk (& zl ...))]]]]]m
see/represent/elect mei
b. *Ii see/represent/elect [NP ‘us’ [SC proi [PP COMIT [xj (& yk (& zl
...))]]]]]m
c. hej/k/l sees/represents/elects [NP ‘us’ [SC proi [PP COMIT [xj (& yk (&
zl ...))]]]]]m
In (19a), proi does not c-command mei; hence Principle B will never be
violated in this kind of context — binding is coindexation with a c-
commanding antecedent; since c-command between proi and mei fails in
(19a), no binding will ever ensue, Principle B is respected, and (8a) is ruled
in. No binding problems are expected in (19c), the representation of (8c),
either. For even though he c-commands NP, the pronouns x, y, z are perfect-
ly free to be bound by a c-commanding SC–external noun phrase: the
governing category for x, y, z in (18) is the SC.
Things are different in (19b), which represents (8b). Here, Principle B
is violated. This time Ii not only c-commands proi, but it also finds itself in
pro’s governing category. For the governing category for proi in (19b) is
the first category outside NP that has a subject (SC lacks a governor for
pro; and NP is not an accessible SUBJECT for pro since it dominates pro (cf.
*[hisi cook]i). So with the complex pronominal NP sitting in the regular ob-
ject position,  proi will be bound in its governing category if the subject of
the clause is a first person singular pronoun. This is why (19b)/(8b) is ill-
formed.
To avoid a clash with Principle B in (19b), the complex pronominal NP
must not itself be the direct object of the verb. Two options present them-
selves, both featuring an abstract object noun phrase with a null head (anno-
tated here as ‘Ø’, arguably a null demonstrative — see also fn. 8, below).
The pronominal NP in (18) could either be embedded in the direct object,
                                                                                                                  
discusses (French, Dutch) there are non-trivial differences between first and second
person plural pronouns when it comes to inclusive reference anaphora. As far as the
Hungarian agreement facts canvassed in this paper are concerned, no systematic
differences seem to assert themselves, however: the paradigms in (8) and (9) carry
over into the realm of the second person.
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serving as the predicate of the direct object’s null head, as in (20a) — here
the DP–embedded SC is the governing category for the 1SG pro inside ‘us’
in (18), and within this SC, pro can be free as desired; or it could be in a
non-argument position, loosely construed with the null element in the direct
object position, as in (20b).
(20)a. v/AgrO ... [VP V [DP D[def] [SC Øi [NP ‘us’ (=(18))]i]]]
b. v/AgrO ... [VP V [DP D[def] [NP Ø]i] (...)] [NP ‘us’ (=(18))]i
In (20a), the first person plural pronoun functions as the predicate of a DP–
embedded small clause whose subject is a null demonstrative. Thus, (20a)
can essentially be paraphrased as ‘those who are us’ — with the whole NP
in (18) serving as a predicate of a null noun phrase, much like in free
relatives. The structure in (20b) is basically the ‘relative clause extraposit-
ion’ counterpart of (20a) (on a base-generation approach to ‘extraposition’;
cf. e.g. Rochemont and Culicover 1990), akin to ‘list/ colon’ constructions
(‘these/the following: me with x, y, z’; cf. Higgins 1979, Koster 1995): the
NP in (18) is rather more loosely construed with the null noun phrase here
than it is in (20a); it is outside the confines of the direct object altogether.7
The choice between the two representations in (20) is immaterial as far
as we are concerned. The key point for us is that, given the standard binding
theory of Chomsky (1981), we correctly force the first person plural
pronoun out of the regular direct object position — it can be embedded
inside the direct object as in (20a) or it can be loosely linked to the direct
object position as in (20b); but in any event it cannot be the direct object all
by itself: (19b) is ruled out by Principle B.8 Whichever of the two structures
                                                          
7. For some speakers (9b) is better with bennünket than with minket — though in
cases not involving inclusive reference anaphora they actually have a preference for
minket over bennünket. This shift of preference may be a consequence of the fact
that, in the representation of (9b), the first person plural pronoun is not itself the
direct object but rather a ‘modifier’ thereof: it may be that, for some speakers, it is
easier to use bennünket (which is formally a PP) that way than minket (a nominal
expression); PPs are well known to be more ‘versatile’ than NP/DPs.
8. In French, the first person plural object pronoun in I...us cases of pronominal
inclusive reference anaphora does have a crucial direct object property: it triggers
agreement on a past participle (cf. (i), below; Johan Rooryck, p.c.). If French
structurally represents I...us inclusive reference anaphora the same way as
Hungarian, our analysis will take these gender and number (but crucially not person
or definiteness) agreement facts to be the result of an agreement relationship
between the participle and the null demonstrative heading the direct object (cf.
(20)); the null demonstrative in turn agrees in number and gender (but not person,
definiteness) with the pronominal noun phrase that it is construed with.
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in (20) we end up choosing (and remember that they do not necessarily
exclude one another: (20b) may well be the ‘extraposition’ counterpart of
(20a)), the fact that the ‘real’ direct object is a null definite correctly rules
out indefinite agreement in (8b). The standard Principle B in (3b) thus
manages to make the desired distinction between (8b) and (9b), given a
representation of first person plural pronouns as in (18).
We have already seen that Principle B also captures the grammaticality
of (8a,c): the representations in (19a) and (19c), representing these
indefinite agreement examples, are well-formed. To rule out definite
agreement in these contexts (as in (9a) and (9c)), what now remains to be
said is that structures of the type in (20) will be resorted to only if there is
no other choice. Recourse to structural economy will do the job here —
structures like (20) are more complex than the ones in (19) in that they
contain a null-headed noun phrase in addition to the pronominal constituent
in (18); by general economy guidelines, (20) will hence be employed only if
using the structurally simpler (19) delivers an ill-formed output. With this
much said, we have all the Hungarian facts in (8) and (9) under control.
Principle B of the standard binding theory, in conjunction with the structure
of first person plural pronouns in (18), leads us there straightforwardly.
By contrast, Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) ‘reflexivity’ approach
cannot in any straigthtforward way take advantage of the structure in (18) to
account for Hungarian (8) and (9): we are obviously not dealing with
syntactically reflexive predicates; but when we invoke semantic predicates,
(18) is unlikely to be of assistance. The bottom line is that we still fail to
account for the asymmetry between the a- and b-examples, and presumably
also for the contrast between the b- and c-sentences. We do not mean to
suggest that the reflexivity approach could not possibly capture (8) and (9);
it seems hard to imagine an account of them, though.
So we have seen in this section that pronominal inclusive reference
anaphora of the Hungarian type is perfectly compatible with the approach to
pronoun binding restrictions taken in Chomsky (1981) (with no need for
sophisticated definitions of ‘free’ à la Lasnik 1986, or any other special
amendations), given a syntactically complex representation of first person
plural pronouns along the lines sketched out in (18).9
                                                                                                                  
(i) je nous ai conduites à la gare
I us havedriven-F.PL to the station
‘I drove us to the station’
9. Recall that not all speakers of Hungarian are equally happy with (9b). In this
context it may be relevant to note that Hungarian exhibits speaker/dialect variation
in a domain that, on the approach to (9b) taken here, may in fact turn out to be
closely related. While many Hungarians reject (ia) and (iia) (using a reflexive
instead, as seen in (ib) and (iib)), there are speakers for whom the a–examples are
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3.2. The anaphor cases
The downside of the Hungarian data canvassed in the foregoing is that
they seem to complicate the picture of anaphor binding. For recall that,
unlike English, Hungarian allows (in fact, prefers) a reflexive anaphor in
the object position of inclusive reference anaphora constructions cor-
responding to English I...us (cf.  (5b)).
The resulting picture is one of full complementary distribution between
pronouns and anaphors in the paradigms in (5) and (8), which is good news.
But what is less pleasant about (5b) is that it does not seem to fit in with
either Principle A in (3a) or Condition A in (4a) — the reflexive is not
bound, and the predicate that it reflexive-marks is not in fact (fully)
reflexive.
We believe, though, that regardless of what the optimal analysis of
Hungarian reflexive facts should turn out to be (and we will not have space
here to address this question in any detail), it is unlikely that the binding
theory will need to make special amends for Hungarian (5b) — in all
likelihood, its grammaticality should be made to fall out from special
properties of the reflexives of Hungarian rather than from some complicat-
ion of the binding condition on anaphors. In particular, the morphological
properties of the Hungarian reflexive seem crucial here — mag-unk-at is
the concatenation of the noun root mag (whose lexical meaning is
‘core/kernel’), a possessive inflectional suffix -unk (for first person plural)
and the accusative marker; the same is true of the other Hungarian
reflexives. In essence, then, magunkat is the accusative form of ‘our core’.
If the possessive identity of Hungarian reflexives is in fact syntactically
real, in the sense that the syntactic structure of Hungarian reflexives is that
of a possessed noun phrase, then (5b) is syntactically parallel to something
like ‘I represent/vote for our friend’, which of course straightforwardly
supports an inclusive reference interpretation.
                                                                                                                  
perfect. What these examples share with the sentence in (9b), if the latter is analysed
as suggested in the main text (cf. (20)), is that the pronoun finds itself (embedded in)
an adjunct/non-argument position. Exactly how to integrate (9b) and (ia)/(iia) into a
comprehensive theory is an issue we cannot go into here.
(i) a. %vigyél  pro veled eserny W
take-2SG.INDEF with-2SG umbrella-ACC
b. vigyél magaddal HVHUQ\ W
take-2SG.INDEF yourself-with umbrella-ACC
(ii) a. %látok pro mellettem egy kígyót
see-1SG.INDEF beside-1SG a snake-ACC
b. látok magam mellett egy kígyót
see-1SG.INDEF myself  beside a snake-ACC
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If this is on the right track, all of the inclusive reference anaphora facts
of Hungarian are accommodated by the standard Binding Theory of
Chomsky (1981) without any difficulty. In particular, what we have found
is that Principle B makes precisely the desired cut in the Hungarian pronoun
cases, given an independently motivated analysis of first (and second)
person plural pronouns in terms of a comitative structure of the type in (18).
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